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Truth and Illusion 
SUZANNE LAST STONE 
SEVERAL YEARS AGO I was invited to comment on various rabbinic 
texts about true and false prophecy. One text, in particular, resisted quick 
interpretation. The text, hSanbeJri11 89a, begins: "Rabbi Isaac said: The 
same communication [dtgnon, from the Latin dt'gnum, meaning watchword] 
occurs to several prophets, yet no two prophets prophesy the same com-
munication [,1t'g11011]." Rabbi Isaac cites Jeremiah and Obadiah, who each 
delivered the same message from God but expressed it with stylistic vari-
ation. Rabbi Isaac's comment on the literary record of prophecy is identi-
fied by the Talmud as the test of true and false prophecy used by the 
King of Judah to judge the four hundred prophets of King Ahab false. 
All predicted victory in battle "with one mouth," in identical language 
(1 Kgs 22). 
Is the prophet's individual speech the work of the prophet or of God? 
Moshe Greenberg cites Rabbi Isaac to show that premoderns, although 
formally adhering to the doctrine of divine dictation, readily conceded the 
human contribution in prophecy when reflecting on the literary evidence. 
Rabbi Isaac's comment, however, recalls midrashic descriptions of the 
overflow of meaning in a divine statement, which human speech 
cannot replicate. The varied formulations of a single message from God 
may be one more example of the multiplicity engendered from singularity 
that is a mark of divine speech. In either case, how does the Talmud 
understand the relationship of the prophet's speech to truth? Is individual 
expression a test of true prophecy or of the true prophet, pointing to the 
qualities of mind or character of those who are trusted to convey God's 
word? Or is the test, as other rabbinic texts suggest, an application of the 
laws of testimonial witnesses to prophets, who also claim private knowl-
edge of the ttuth? 
Still other questions are suggested by the continuation of this talmudic 
passage, which more clearly focuses on the human factor in prophecy. 
The Talmud searches for a legal justification for punishing Zedekiah, who 
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was among the four hundred. Zedekiah, the rabbis scrupulously note, did 
not utter a false prophecy with the intention to deceive. He was seduced 
by a lying spirit sent by God. "\Vhat could he have done?" the Talmud 
asks. And the Talmud answers: "He ought to have scrutinized the matter 
in light of Rabbi Isaac's tradition" that no two prophets deliver even the 
same message from God in identical language. The Talmud adopts Rabbi 
Isaac's tradition as a normative test of true prophecy, binding on the 
prophet himself. But why can't the prophet take his own spontaneous 
experience and sincere apprehension of prophecy as true? Ancient and 
modern psychology converge here. The Talmud implicitly recognizes that 
the human capacity to perceive the difference between a genuine external 
event and illusion is fragile. Here, a lying spirit deceives. Elsewhere in 
Scripture, false prophecy is said to have its origins in the wishes, dreams, 
or imagination of the prophet and is often stimulated by a need to express 
the agreeable (Jer 23). So, the Talmud imposes a duty on the prophet 
himself to search his truth claim for error, in light objective methods 
the law deems truth-acquiring. 
With this passage, the Talmud invites us to reflect on the human capac-
ity and obligation to discern and convey the truth, a question as relevant 
for moderns as for the ancients. How do we ascertain the truth of claims 
of private knowledge that, as Kant said, "has its grounds in the particular 
character of the subject?" \Vhom do we trust to speak truthfully in public 
life and how do we understand the relationship of truth to self-expression 
and individuality? How do those who hold themselves out as transmitters 
of knowledge or true information in society resist not only external pres-
sures such as popular sentiment but also internal forces of self-deception, 
wishful thinking, and fantasy? 
One final question: \Vhy does this particular talmudic text so engage 
the attention of a writer on Jewish and comparative legal theory? No 
doubt, the text appeals because it invites modern questions and because 
its interpretation demands the bringing together of many disciplines from 
the legal and literary to the epistemological and psychological. But the 
more complex answer lies in personal biography and begins with an en-
counter with three texts, unrelated to matters Jewish, that captured my 
imagination over thirty years ago. Two are works by the classicist Eric 
Dodds, Papan and ChriAian in an A_9e a/ An..:icty ( 1965) and The Greekc1 and 
the lrratumal (1971), and the third is Hans Jonas's The GnoJtic Religion 
(1970). 
Each book describes a critical moment in the late antique world: the 
collapse the classical Greek humanist view of a rationally ordered, 
neutral cosmos and, with it, the rise of a variety of magical practices and 
TRUTH AND ILLUSION. STONE 21 
religious attitudes, including apocalypticism and gnosticism. The "Return 
of the Irrational" in hellenistic society, Dodds wrote, came about from 
"the fear of freedom, the unconscious flight from the heavy burden of 
individual choice that a free society lays upon its members" (Greek, anJ 
the lrratwnal, p. 252). Dodds later wrote of the anxiety that gripped pa-
gans and Christians, the distrust of"daylight reality" and ordinary human 
experience, when the sense of the withdrawal of divinity from the world 
became palpable. Jonas described the feeling of alienation from the 
world, homelessness, and near nihilism that the Christian gnostics experi-
enced. The psychological mood of that age struck a chord of recognition, 
one that occurs when two ages momentarily seem to align. For both au-
thors, the late antique age was a parallel of our own, civilizations that had 
become dominated by impersonal principles, technology, and materialism 
and lacked an organic sense of community. Dodds and Jonas strove to 
understand the ancients through the lens of the modern predicament and, 
even more boldly, to read the ancients' experience as a cautionary lesson 
for their own age of anxiety. 
I also f'elt a sense of empathy with that age and intended to make 
Jewish religious attitudes in late antiquity the center of my work. In my 
all too brief days as a student of early rabbinic religion, nothing was 
more fascinating than uncovering evidence of "irrationalism," not only in 
Jewish sectarian literature but in rabbinic texts, including the persistence 
of prophecy, magic, and the power of dreams in the rabbinic imagination. 
My fascination with both the early rabbinic period and "the irrational" 
persists to this day. But legal training and an academic position within a 
community that values the role of law in society subtly changed my focus. 
The goal of law is to regulate irrational forces in society and to subject 
them to the skeptical, sober, and reflective light of day. Law, these days, 
is often criticized as overly traditional, cold, and objective, preserving a 
past that no longer speaks to the present and putting an arbitrary end to 
the search for truth for the sake of order. The rule of law is, however, a 
normative ideal, one of critical moment in our new age of anxiety, if not 
terror, when irrational forces have entered into the heart of political life. 
Law's focus is also on truth, but it offers a different vision from prophecy 
or philosophy of where truth is lodged and how best to access and acquire 
it. 
I have spent part of this of my academic life explicating that tense 
"coexistence of opposites, of prophecy and law, charisma and institution," 
in rabbinic thought. Now I am turning my attention to how irrational 
and suprarational phenomena, such as magic and prophecy, fare when 
subjected to rabbinic legal analysis-an analysis shaped, in turn, by a 
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distinct conception of human psychology. That fine legal dissection of the 
literary legacy of true and false prophecy, for example, led the talmudic 
rabbis and their successors to reflect on universal issues of truth-acquisi-
tion and to question whether prophecy, which promises ultimate knowl-
edge of the truth, is as uncertain and unreliable, if not more so, than 
human reasoning. Their critique rested as much on the inherent limits of 
human cognition as on the frailties of human psychology. Humans have 
a limited capacity to distinguish truth from falsity or, as Maimonides 
framed it, prophecy from sorcery. Moreover, the human actors who must 
be trusted to convey God's words are capable of error as well as deceit, 
self-deception, illusion, and resistance to the world as it is. This sober yet 
passionate attention to human psychology links the rabbinic texts to those 
formative texts of Dodds and Jonas, whose works still resonate with me. 
